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[VOL. 45 a territorial concept, capable of ownership like the dry land, towards regarding it as an extraterritorial area in which there was an exclusive coastal State management regime over the natural resources. They evolved from initial British concern, expressed mainly by the Foreign and Colonial Offices, to secure coastal State control of exploitable oil resources located off the coasts of certain overseas territories, towards an appreciation by the Ministry of Power and the Crown Estate Office that similar problems could arise in respect of a range of mineral resources off the coasts of the United Kingdom itself.
The res nullius/occupation/sovereignty stage
When the legal nature of the submarine area beyond the belt of territorial sea began to become a subject of interest, the official view which came to prevail was that it was a res nullius, with the implication that sovereignty over it could be acquired by State acts of effective occupation, provided that the freedom of the superjacent waters was not impaired. It was Sir Cecil Hurst, the principal legal adviser to the Foreign Office and later a judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, who expressed influential academic views to this effect, first in an article published in 1923 which dealt mainly with the surface of the bed of the sea 12 and, two years later, more specifically in the context of international law, in a 1 contribution to the Hague meeting of the Institut de Droit International in 1925. 13 Shortly after this, Arnold McNair, who later became a judge of the International Court of Justice, in his 1928 edition of the first volume of Oppenheim's International Law, considered that sovereignty over the surface of the bed of the high seas could be acquired by local occupation; its subsoil, furthermore, was "no man's land, and it can be acquired on the part of a littoral State through occupation, starting from the subsoil beneath the bed of the territorial sea".
14 It was to these writings that Foreign Office legal advisers turned when they had to express the British view of contemporary international law to those interested in offshore oil exploration by means of drilling rigs located outside the territorial sea. 15 In response to interest from oil companies, the British government put this view to practical use on 6 August 1942 when, having first concluded a treaty with Venezuela to recognise each other's claims to sovereignty over defined parts of the submarine land of the Gulf of Paria, 16 it promulgated JANUARY 1996] Continental Shelf Rights in UK Law 17 under the royal prerogative the Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria (Annexation) Order 1942," by which parts of the submarine area in the Gulf of Paria outside the territorial sea of the colony of Trinidad and Tobago were "annexed to and form part of His Majesty's dominions and shall be attached to the Colony of Trinidad and Tobago for administrative purposes". This "paper occupation" was far removed from the tunnelling which Arnold McNair regarded as necessary.
The res nuWius/proclamation/sovereignty stage
After the Second World War the United Kingdom had to respond to relevant commercial influences in two overseas areas: first, a continuing pressure to establish a regime for oil exploration and exploitation off the coasts of certain British colonies; and, second, similar pressure in respect of the Persian Gulf, on one coast of which were a number of coastal sheikhdoms under treaties of protection with the United Kingdom, together with Saudi Arabia which, though not a protected State in the formal sense, was dependent upon legal and political advice from US sources, both governmental and commercial. On the opposite coast was Persia.
The Foreign and Colonial Offices were considering the possibility of action similar to that taken in the Gulf of Paria in respect of submarine areas beyond the territorial seas of the Bahamas and Jamaica colonies, to be preceded by a treaty of mutual recognition with the United States, when in May 1945 the US State Department gave early warning to the British Embassy in Washington of the United States' intention to proclaim, inter alia, that the natural resources of the bed and subsoil of the shelf beneath the high seas contiguous to its coasts appertained to the United States and were subject to its jurisdiction and control. 18 The United States' proposed action produced mixed feelings among the British government legal advisers. On the one hand, it was considered that unilateral action was inappropriate and that title to such areas could be built up only through recognition by other States of the coastal State's claim, as the United Kingdom had sought to do through the treaty with Venezuela. Furthermore, the proposed proclamation was considered to be far too imprecise in the area it covered and to dispense with what was considered by the British advisers to be-the necessity for effective occupation. On the other hand, the proposed proclamation had the merits of avoiding a need for effective occupation and of preventing a State other than the coastal State from gaining sovereignty over the shelf adjacent to the territorial sea by pre-emptive occupation. It is now necessary . • • that the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to the sub-soil beneath the sea immediately adjacent to territorial waters should be determined. This declaration of the United States is now a fact. It may be right in law or wrong in law, but the declaration has been made by a great and very determined power. We have got to be careful that we do not get the worst of both worlds ... It is a fact, moreover, that the United States are doing (improperly no doubt as we think) by unilateral declaration, the same thing as we wanted to do by agreement in the case of the Bahamas. It therefore is a matter for serious consideration whether our policy should not be one of making reservations to the United States declaration but in fact of adopting it ourselves in cases where it suits us.
Beckett convened an inter-departmental meeting on 16 January 1946. Its conclusions read in part:
21 That it appears that the policy for His Majesty's Government to adopt would be publicly to recognise that the principles contained in the United States proclamation with respect to natural resources of the sub-soil and sea bed of the continental shelf are sound and of general application.
The meeting also agreed that the Governors of the Bahamas and Jamaica should make proclamations applying these principles.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, considered that the matter had to go to Cabinet, particularly in view of the implications for the Persian Gulf. Beckett accordingly began to draft a memorandum for Bevin to present to Cabinet. On 16 October 1946 he submitted a draft to Bevin, who minuted upon it:
22
I have never felt difficulty so far as the Bahamas or West Indies is concerned, but the Persian Gulf is political dynamite. It will have to be handled carefully. I must have a little more time to study it. See me about it but you can go ahead with the rest.
On the basis of Bevin's authority, which was not countermanded by the Cabinet when the final memorandum was put before it at its meeting on 4 November 1948, 23 the boundaries of a number of British colonies were extended by Orders in Council promulgated under the Colonial Bound-aries Act 1895 so as to incorporate the bed and subsoil of the continental shelf within the colony. These were the Bahamas (Alteration of Boundaries) Order 1948 (S.I. 1948 No.2574 
The inherent right/proclamation/sovereignty stage
Although the policy of the UK authorities was now to follow the principles of the Truman Proclamation, they thought that the basis of that instrument was the annexation of a res nullius notwithstanding the view of the State Department's lawyers to the contrary. Beckett, in particular, minuted on 11 August 1948 that "we cannot as a matter of public international law, understand how a state can acquire jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf outside its territorial waters except by annexing it as res nullius"." That the res nullius theory was still alive was illustrated by a remark in [VOL.45 subject of the law of the sea at which he radically realigned his earlier views. 29 Substantially at Beckett's initiative, the meeting agreed on a concept of the shelf which was not based on a res nullius theory but on that of an "inchoate right" which a coastal State might perfect through declaration or similar formal instrument. The deliberations in the International Law Commission on the subject of the shelf gave the United Kingdom the opportunity to advance the revised view. 30 At its third session, in 1951, the special rapporteur, J. P. A.
Francois, put forward a draft Article 2 as follows: "The continental shelf is subject to the exercise by the coastal State of control and jurisdiction for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources." 31 The
Commission wrote in a note accompanying the draft Article:
32
It would seem to serve no purpose to refer to the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas in question as res nullius, capable of being acquired by the first occupier. That conception might lead to chaos, and it would disregard the fact that in most cases the effective exploitation of the natural resources will depend on the existence of installations on the territory of the coastal State to which the submarine areas are contiguous.
It went on:
Article 2 avoids any reference to "sovereignty" of the coastal State over the submarine areas of the continental shelf. As control and jurisdiction by the coastal State would be exclusively for exploration and exploitation purposes, they cannot be placed on the same footing as the general powers exercised by a State over its territory and its territorial waters. and jurisdiction", even though the two expressions are probably intended to have the same meaning.
In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf are of the same nature as its rights over its land territory, and it would be desirable to state this precisely in the draft. Her Majesty's Government agree that it is for the time being impracticable to develop submarine areas internationally; that the continental shelf is not res nullius; and that the right to exercise sovereignty over the continental shelf is independent of the concept of occupation.
In its practice, the United Kingdom continued to promulgate instruments under the Colonial Boundaries Act 1895 extending colonial boundaries to embrace the adjacent shelf, that is, to act on the basis that the shelf was the subject of sovereignty. The Convention does not provide that the coastal State has "sovereignty" over the continental shelf; the concept of full sovereignty over the continental shelf outside territorial waters was considered to be inconsistent with the concept of the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas and that of the air space above those waters, a concept which is specifically affirmed in Article 3 of the Convention.
B. In United Kingdom Law
The prevailing executive opinion in the period prior to the signature of the 1958 Conventions was that the seabed and subsoil at least up to the seaward limit of the territorial sea of the United Kingdom were part of the Crown Estate and under the management of the Crown Estate Commissioners established by Crown lands legislation. 41 This view derived not so much from the rule of customary international law whereby coastal States possess sovereignty to this limit, but from a perception of the his- The history of these claims had been described in his 1923 article by Sir Cecil Hurst, who concluded that as regards Great Britain "the ownership of the bed of the sea within the three-mile limit is the survival of more extensive claims to the ownership of and sovereignty over the bed of the sea". 42 A similar view was taken in respect of British dependent territories, or at least those in which the English common law ran. 41 The Commissioners, who had the statutory duty of administering the Crown Estate, considered that their jurisdiction extended at least to the seaward limit of the territorial sea and acted accordingly in making grants, leases and licences for purposes of construction and of mineral dredging and extraction. The Commissioners' contemporary view of the extent of Crown ownership is indicated in a memorandum on the subject of foreshore and seabed which they issued on 7 August 1958: Even assuming that there had been, in Hurst's words, a "silent abandonment" of a property claim to submarine areas beyond the territorial sea in general, at least one legal ground was perceived to support Crown proprietary rights in specific areas. In his 1923 article Hurst wrote as follows: "where effective occupation has been long maintained of portions of the bed of the sea outside the three-mile limit, those claims are valid and subsisting claims, entitled to recognition by other States". 45 As long ago as 1875, the British members of a joint Anglo-French Commission on the Channel Tunnel had given its view that if a tunnel were driven out from shore in Kent beyond three miles it 46 would be situate in England, and would belong to the Crown (and become subject to the jurisdiction of the British Parliament), if by no other title, at all events by the title which would be derived from the first occupancy and 42. (1923-24) 
47
In the years immediately before the conclusion of the Convention on the Continental Shelf there were a few examples of practice in respect of the submarine area beyond the three-mile limit which raised relevant legal questions within government departments. In November 1954 the National Coal Board, which wished to carry out boring operations from fixed towers erected within three miles of the low-water mark in the Firth of Forth and on the coast of Durham, requested the Ministry of Fuel and Power to obtain an assurance from "the appropriate Department" that these proposed operations were situated "within Great Britain". The Board wrote that it had received counsel's opinion that there was "a slight doubt" on this. The Ministry of Power, however, advised the respective Minister in the Home Office and the Scottish Office "not to make a declaration which, apparently could involve him and the Courts in grave embarrassment". JANUARY 1996]
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The Crown Estate Office was involved in a further piece of significant practice in October 1957 when the Welsh Office asked it whether it had jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea in respect of the licensing of the removal of sand and gravel. 50 A legal adviser in the Crown Estate Office, J. G. Allan, who had been provided with a typescript copy of Hurst's 1923 article, minuted on 7 November 1957:
The Crown's claim to the bed of the sea was formulated before the doctrine of the three mile limit was propounded. It follows therefore, in my opinion, that, although there may have been a non-enforcement of the Crown's rights to the soil of the sea beyond the three mile limit, those rights can be reasserted by the successful exercise of acts of ownership. Such Crown ownership is implicit in the Sea Fisheries Acts and was specifically recognized in assessing the compensation paid to the Crown under the Coal Act, 1938, since some of the Crown's undersea mines (e.g. at Whitehaven) in respect of which compensation was paid extended beyond the three mile limit.
The Crown Estate Office accordingly informed the Welsh Office that "we are advised that there is no reason why the Crown should not exercise acts of ownership over the bed of the sea beyond the three-mile limit, especially in a case where such acts are carried out in conjunction with the occupation of the soil beneath territorial waters".
These were isolated incidents and it appears that official interest in the submarine area beyond the territorial sea of the United Kingdom was low even up to the eve of the conclusion of the 1958 Convention. Thus, in a parliamentary reply on 23 April 1958, the Minister of State at the Foreign Office observed: "I understand that, with the possible exception of the Channel Tunnel, the development of the Continental Shelf of the United Kingdom is not a burning question, and so far as I am aware no plans have yet been made to deal with it." 51 Likewise, in a memorandum to Cabinet of 16 June 1958 which recommended that all four Geneva Conventions and the optional protocol on the settlement of disputes "should be signed with a view to ratification in due course", the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs saw no immediate interest in the shelf adjoining the United Kingdom when he wrote:
52
The United Kingdom has a special interest in respect of the continental shelf lying off the shores of a number of Colonial territories and of the Sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf; it may also become important for the exploitation of the sea bed surrounding Great Britain and the Channel Islands. 
26
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C. Conclusion on Pre-Signature Position
It would appear that the UK government, having come to support the concept of the legal nature of the continental shelf which became expressed in Article 2 of the Convention, had earlier purported to acquire areas of shelf adjacent to certain colonies on the basis of a view of international law which was not embodied in the Convention and was probably incompatible with it. Furthermore, while the Crown considered that the bed and subsoil to the limits of the territorial sea were Crown land, it was not clear whether it had made an unequivocal and general "silent abandonment" of its historical claims to ownership of submarine land beyond the limits of the contemporary territorial sea, as opposed merely to the non-enforcement of them.
III. THE REPERCUSSIONS WITHIN THE BRITISH EXECUTIVE OF SIGNATURE OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF CONVENTION, 1958
A. The Colonial Boundary Extensions
The Colonial Office initially adopted a wide interpretation of the words "sovereign rights" in Article 2(1). In a circular dated 22 October 1958 sent to the governments of all the dependent territories with a sea coastline, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated:
55
Article 2 provides for the sovereignty of the coastal state over the continental shelf for the purposes of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. This is a restricted sovereignty but the main intention of the drafting was to ensure that no claims to sovereignty over its superjacent high seas (which might have led to indefinite extensions of the territorial sea) could be based upon it.
About the time that the Geneva Conference was adopting the final text of the Convention on the Continental Shelf in April 1958, the government of the colony of Trinidad and Tobago raised with the Colonial Office the possibility that a boundaries extension Order in Council might be promulgated to include within the colony certain parts of the submarine land south-west of Tobago and south-east of Trinidad where oil companies were interested in having licences for drilling. The areas lay outside those covered by the Gulf of Paria Order of 1942. Within the Colonial Office, D. G. Gordon-Smith, one of its legal advisers, minuted on 18 June 1958 that in the light of the Convention's use of the term "sovereign rights" it seemed doubtful whether the Crown could in future annex the shelf or maintain that it was under its complete sovereignty. 
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Gordon-Smith's minute was sent to the Foreign Office under cover of a letter dated 7 August 1958 asking whether annexation of the shelf would be precluded by international law in the light of Article 2(1) of the Convention. 55 In a reply dated 30 October 1958 the Foreign Office must have intimated that annexation was no longer an option. 56 The reply was not satisfactory to Gordon-Smith. In a minute dated 15 December 1958 he wrote: 57 A country has sovereignty over the seabed and subsoil under its territorial waters because it is under those waters; it has sovereignty, or as the case may be, sovereign rights over the continental shelf for different reasons. I f nevertheless the distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights for certain purposes is as important as the Fforeign] O[ffice] thinks it is, the question arises what should we do about colonial continental shelves which have already been annexed. To undo the annexation may not be as easy as the original annexation since, at first sight, it seems possible that Parliament's approval, given by Act of Parliament, might be necessary.
By a letter dated 23 December 1958 the Colonial Office again referred the matter back to the Foreign Office, this time telling them that the Trinidad authorities now wanted the submarine areas in the Gulf of Paria, which had been administratively attached to the colony, to be brought within the colony's boundaries. 58 In Nigeria, too, there was interest in the possibility of annexation of the continental shelf for the facilitation of oil exploration. 59 It would appear that this time the Foreign Office reply made it clearer that annexation was out of the question. Indeed, the Colonial Office told the Governor-General of Nigeria on 10 March 1959: "The Foreign Office have concluded that the wording of article 2(1) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf precludes incorporation of the Shelf adjacent to Nigeria within the boundaries of Nigeria." 60 Consequently, the option of a boundary extension order being excluded, the Colonial Office put to the Law Officers of the Crown the question whether the legislature of a colony or protectorate might, by virtue of its power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the territory, enact laws governing the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf outside the territorial sea. The question raised not only an issue of international law, given the terms of Article 2(1) of the Continental Shelf Convention recently concluded, but also, in vie w of the perceived doctrine of colonial extra-colonial legislative 55 It seems to us to be clear that as against the States ratifying that Convention, colonial legislation relating to the exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources would be valid in public international law.
On the point of the extraterritorial competence of colonial legislatures, the Law Officers advised: "In the present state of the authorities it is not possible to advise with complete confidence, but it seems to us that the risk of a successful challenge to the validity of such legislation is so insubstantial that the Colonial Governments concerned can properly be advised to accept it."
The Colonial Office thereupon drafted a circular despatch for the information of dependent territories and sent a copy to the Foreign Office for advice and clearance. A paragraph of the draft concerned the question whether the existing boundary extension orders should be amended or revoked. The Foreign Office's advice was given by J. A. C. Gutteridge, a legal counsellor." She expressed the view that, with the exception of the Gulf of Paria Order, none of these orders had expressly purported to annex the continental shelf and their purpose was to extend the jurisdiction and control of the governments of the colonies over it for the purpose of the exploitation of its natural resources. 64 She thought that the orders should be left as they stood. The Colonial Office sent the final text as a circular, dated 5 November 1959, to all dependent territories with a sea coast. 65 Having stated that further "annexations" by Order in Council must be ruled out as inconsistent with the Convention and having set out the gist of the Law Officers' opinion, the circular contained a paragraph redrafted by Gutteridge which ran as follows:
It is not proposed to alter or revoke existing Orders relating to continental shelves, and if asked by other States how they are reconciled with the Convention, it would be said "... that the Orders were made before the nature of the coastal States rights under international law in respect of the Continental Shelf had been clarified by the Convention; that the purpose of the Orders made under the Colonial Boundaries Act, 1895, was to extend the jurisdiction of the Governments of the Colonies concerned so as to give them control over the seabed and subsoil contiguous to their coasts with a view to the exploitation of its natural resources; and that any rights now exercised under these Orders, or under the Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria (Annexation) Order, 1942, would be the rights recognised by the Convention".
The later practice relating to this policy will be outlined later in this article.
B. Industry Interest in the United Kingdom Shelf
On 26 June 1958 the Cabinet, on the recommendation of the Foreign Secretary, had authorised the signature of all four Geneva Conventions, and the Optional Protocol, "with a view to ratification in due course". 6 * The immediate departmental reaction to the signature of the Convention on the Continental Shelf on 9 September 1958 was that as it required 22 instruments of ratification or accession before coming into force some time would elapse before the United Kingdom would have to decide whether or not to become a party to it. This complacency was threatened, however, when the Shell Petroleum Company wrote on 19 May 1959 to the Petroleum Division of the Ministry of Power applying for an exclusive right to explore for and develop petroleum within an area in the North Sea extending from the seaward limit of the territorial sea between Flamborough Head and Lowestoft outwards to the outer limit of the shelf appertaining to the United Kingdom, which the company took for the purposes of its application to be the median line between the coasts of the United Kingdom and those of the opposite States." The area of the application, which was depicted on an accompanying map as extending northwards to include the Dogger Bank, was calculated by the company to cover some as so extended should equally be regarded as belonging to the Sovereign in right of the Crown and would come under the Commissioners' management.
As regards the Continental Shelf the Commissioners note that the concept of full sovereignty over the Shelf outside territorial waters was considered to be inconsistent with the concept of the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, and that, therefore, only sovereign rights of exploration and exploitation of the natural resources in the Shelf are to be exercised. The Commissioners assume that when consideration is given to the question of the allocation of responsibility for the management of such rights, due regard will be paid to the facts that the seabed beneath adjacent territorial waters is regarded as being vested in the Sovereign in right of the Crown and consequently under the Commissioners' management.
Referring to this letter at the meeting, Fitzmaurice stated that whereas the Crown's rights in the land under the territorial sea were clear, there remained doubts over the submarine area beyond; although the Crown had probably lost such rights by desuetude it might be possible, though by no means certain, to maintain that the Crown still had prior rights in respect of the bed and subsoil outside territorial waters, as a continuation of historical claims. He went on:
70
Furthermore, under the Convention, the coastal State had sovereign rights for certain limited purposes, but not full sovereignty over the continental shelf. Legislation was therefore likely to be required to control the exploitation of the natural resources of the Continental Shelf adjacent to the United Kingdom, but outside the territorial sea. Such legislation would, presumably, provide for the granting of licences.
The meeting decided, inter alia, that in principle it would be preferable first to initiate discussions with the other North Sea riparian States with a view to division of the area; meanwhile, the Ministry of Power would coordinate discussions with other departments as to what type of legislation would be necessary.
The following day Johnstone, who had been at the meeting, wrote to Fitzmaurice." He expressed the opinion that the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 did not apply to any petroleum resources on the shelf since he considered that the shelf lay outside Great Britain. As for coal, an order under section 2 of the Coal Industry Act 1949 could empower the National Coal Board to carry on activities on the shelf though he wondered whether the Board would even then have a monopoly outside territorial waters. He concluded by speculating whether Article 7 of the Continental Shelf Convention removed tunnelling from the land from the effects of the other provisions of the Convention, so that a coastal State could tunnel through the shelf up to the territorial sea of an opposite State. In Fitzmaurice's absence, the reply to Johnstone's letter was written and signed on 8 September 1959 by Gutteridge, who had also attended the meeting.
72 She remarked that "we entirely accept your view that the continental shelf adjacent to, but outside, our territorial waters does not constitute an extension of Great Britain, and therefore that the Act of 1934 does not affect the position of such areas of the Continental Shelf and any petroleum resources which there may be within its strata". As for tunnelling, Gutteridge considered that this was still regulated by customary international law.
The Foreign Office called a further inter-departmental meeting, which met on 8 September I960.
73 It was there agreed that a comprehensive statute was needed, as contrasted with piecemeal amendment of existing statutes, though there was still "no desperate urgency".
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY for handling possible future legislation regarding the shelf was assumed reluctantly by the Ministry of Power in March 1961.
74 It was not until 11 April 1962 that the matter came before the Cabinet's Future Legislation Committee. The outcome of their deliberations was summarised as follows: 75 The Government had taken the unusual step of ratifying the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (dating from 1958) without being in a position to implement its provisions. The Convention was likely to come into force during the 1962/63 Session, and the necessary United Kingdom legislation ought to be passed by then. It was also likely that the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf would soon be ratified by the other governments who had signed it. The possibility of combining these two Bills in a single Bill should be considered before a decision was reached on their place in the programme. : "We are advised that the Government would have no authority to grant rights for exploration and development of petroleum resources beyond the three-mile limit until they obtain statutory powers to that effect." The Foreign Office concern with such interest was the possibility of 'squatter's rights'*.
CAB 134/1925 (F.L.(62) 2nd Meeting) (original emphasis).
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A possible future bill covering both high seas and shelf was allocated to an "in reserve" list of future measures. In commencing the preparation of a paper for the Cabinet's Home Affairs Committee, the Ministry of Power officials were faced with views advanced by the National Coal Board and the Crown Estate Office which required reference to the legal advisers in the Foreign Office.
It was found that the Coal Board had been working submarine mines, driven from the land, beyond the three-mile limit. Order in Council No.389 of 1957 empowered it to "search and bore" for coal in the North Sea outside territorial waters but not beyond a distance of ten miles from the coast. The Ministry of Power pointed out that in order to work coal in this extended area, as opposed to searching and boring for it, a further statutory order was necessary. 76 The Deputy Secretary of the Coal Board, P. W. E. Currie, replied on 15 October 1962 that "the lawyers tell me that the extent of territorial waters is undefined" and, having contended that the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act'1878 did not impose a maximum distance for all purposes, he concluded that "we do not regard our operations beyond the three mile limit as being carried on outside of Great Britain", but even if Great Britain were to end at three miles, underground operations beyond this distance would "extend the territory of Great Britain".
77
In a letter to Sir Francis Vallat, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office, dated 24 October 1962, Johnstone set out the Coal Board's arguments and put the question to Vallat: "Where does Great Britain end?"
78 Having pointed out that the question was relevant both to coal and to oil and gas, he concluded:
It seems to me that we must endeavour to get it settled one way or the other, and since I have failed totally to discover any authoritative statement upon the exact point now in issue I feel that I must seek your assistance as the matter is essentially one of International Law, and if any one were able to speak with authority upon the point it would clearly be yourself. The Ministry of Power officials were alarmed at this view, which they considered to be inconsistent with the position which they had adopted to date on the advice of the Foreign Office. Accordingly, Johnstone brought the letter to the attention of Vallat, stating 81 it would be to our considerable advantage if we could adopt the view of Gill and the [National Coal Board], because if it was certain that the Shelf became part of Great Britain it would automatically fall within the relevant provisions of the relevant Acts relating to petroleum and coal and it might well prove in the end that we did not need a Bill at all.
When the Ministry of Power consulted the Crown
If, however, we adopt the other view which we have hitherto held, that there is a distinction between "Sovereignty" and "Sovereign Rights" in relation to certain specified matters, i.e. the exploration and exploitation of the Shelf, then we cannot I think accept the bulk of the propositions contained in Gill's letter any more than we can those put forward~by~the Coal Board.
On 8 November 1962, Vallat replied to Johnstone's letters on the two matters above. 82 He stated that although the distinction between "sovereignty" and "sovereign rights" was a fine one it was important to maintain it. He went on: While I think that the position under the convention is clear, namely that Sovereignty does not extend beyond the territorial sea, it appears that there may be a number of complications under our domestic legislation for your Ministry, for the National Coal Board and for the Crown Estate Office. 83 Having pointed out the substantial economic advantages through import replacement which might accrue on ratification of the Convention, he observed that, although the Convention could be ratified as a prerogative act without parliamentary approval, legislation was unavoidable, not only to impose duties on individuals to respect the prohibitions and obligations in the Convention but particularly to enable the government to assure oil companies of security of tenure in their operations. He continued: "I am advised that when the Crown acquires sovereign rights over the appropriate part of the Shelf the latter does not thereby in law become part of the United Kingdom." After proposing that the legislation relating to petroleum and coal should be extended to the shelf, he stated that as regards the management of other resources "the Crown Estate Office propose, and other Departments agree, that the Crown Estate Commissioners should, with minor exceptions, be made responsible". The Minister also remarked that it was expedient to implement provisions in the Convention on the High Seas, already ratified by the United Kingdom, by including in the same proposed legislation provisions for punishment and civil responsibility for those who damaged submarine cables and pipelines.
The Home Affairs Committee considered the memorandum at their meeting on 30 November 1962 and approved in principle its proposals for legislation in connection with the two Conventions.
84
Further pressure for speedy legislation occurred at this time when sandand gravel-dredging companies operating off the coasts of Sussex, Essex and Suffolk asserted that no legal powers existed to control dredging outside the three-mile limit. The report of an inter-departmental meeting held on 8 January 1963 to discuss the matter stated At present the dredging companies are inclined to accept a measure of voluntary control outside the three mile limit, but the longer the legislation is delayed the more difficult it will be to stop them adopting a free-for-all attitude. The Convention seems to depart from the old concept of the seabed and subsoil as res nullius capable of acquisition by occupation. The intention of the Convention that the seabed and subsoil of the Continental Shelf is not to be regarded as part of the territory of the coastal State is clear from the deliberate use of the expression "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources" rather than "sovereignty".
V. THE CASE TO THE LAW OFFICERS OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND
THE Case to the Law Officers of the Crown in both England
The memorandum took the view that the United Kingdom's ratification would cover all territories for whose international relations the United Kingdom was responsible, "with the exception of the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms, in respect of which an express reservation was made"; 89 thus if the Convention did not confer full sovereignty on the coastal State, the Orders in Council for territories which were still dependent ought to be revoked, and the Sultan of Brunei should be advised to revoke his proclamation purporting to annex the adjacent shelf.
In sending the Case and memorandum to the Law Officers' Department, Johnstone pointed out 90 that the legal adviser to the Crown Estate Office, Allan, had recently told him that he would be content for the shelf to be regarded as outside Great Britain provided that it was made clear in whatever legislation was enacted that the Crown would have the same rights therein as it had in the bed and subsoil of the territorial sea and the foreshore. The National Coal Board, on the other hand, were still adamant that "wherever their shafts go beyond the three mile limit they must be considered as taking the law of Great Britain, or rather the law of England or Scotland, according as to the geographical position, with them".
In 92 They replied to the first two questions in the affirmative. To question (iii)(a) and (b) they replied negatively, adding that it would be necessary to extend the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 and the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, and that special legislation would also be required to regulate the exploration and exploitation of the shelf and to extend to it the relevant law of the constituent parts of the United Kingdom. As to question (iv) they replied:
The question whether the rights conferred by the Convention will be enforceable against States which are not parties to it is difficult. In view of the number of States which are not parties to the Convention, and having regard in particular to the importance of some of those States, we think it would not be safe to assume that these rights will, on the coming into force of the Convention, become immediately enforceable against States which are not parties to it.
The Scottish Law Officers, I. H. Shearer, Lord Advocate, and D. C. Anderson, S.-G. for Scotland, gave their opinion a week or so later.
93
They, too, gave affirmative answers to questions (i) and (ii). Like their English counterparts they replied in the negative to question (iii)(a), adding that in their view the term "Great Britain" in a statute was the statutory concept defined in 1706, meaning the kingdom formed by the Union of England and Scotland. Question (iii)(b) was also answered in the negative, the Scottish Law Officers adding that since the shelf would not be part of the United Kingdom legislation would be required to extend the law which it was wished to apply.
There was a conflict of opinion over the answer to question (iv). The Lord Advocate was of the opinion that "when the Convention comes into force under Article 11 it appears safe to assume that under international law the United Kingdom would be entitled to exercise the rights which the Convention offers as against any other States". The Solicitor-General's views, however, were stated to be in accord with the cautious views expressed on this question by the English Law Officers.
In a minute dated 30 April 1963" Vallat wrote that the answers to the first three questions were "as anticipated" and were "entirely acceptable" but that he had doubts about the answer to the fourth question. In Vallat's view there was "still room for a political decision that we should attempt to maintain our rights... under the Convention against States not parties to it".
VI. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF BILL
ON 15 In his accompanying letter Rowe wrote:
Clause 1(1) will, I hope, be acceptable to the Crown Estate Commissioners ... As I said in my letter of 3rd September I do not construe the Law Offi-100. Ibid. Johnstone noted that the A.-G. and the Lord Advocate had not seen eye to eye and had exchanged "some pretty sharp correspondence". This correspondence arose, it seems, not out of any difference on the law to be expounded in the opinions but from what was described as a dispute between the Foreign Office, which considered that all questions of international law should be dealt with by the English Law Officers, and the Scottish Office, which considered that whenever Scotland was likely to be involved the question should be submitted jointly to the English and Scottish Law Officers. Rowe's draft of clause 1 also contained sub-clauses relating to coal and petroleum along the lines of the provisions later enacted as section 1 (2) and ( The Deputy Commissioner, Gill, submitted a report to the Commissioners for their meeting on 24 September 1963, stating: "I agree that we need have no objection to the proposed drafting, which should give the 1(1) was discussed. A member of the Committee, T. Fraser, was of the view that, since in his opinion the effect of the clause would be to vest in the Crown the property in the natural resources of the shelf and not merely the rights to explore and exploit them, it would be more honest if the Bill was amended to make this "nationalisation" explicit by adding to the provisions of the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 referred to in clause 1(2) a reference also to section 1(1) of that Act by which "the property in petroleum existing in its natural strata in Great Britain is hereby vested in His Majesty"." The legal position is that the United Kingdom's rights are limited to exploring and exploiting the resources of the Shelf. In other words, until someone has taken possession of them, they do not belong to anybody and this country is quite incapable of taking the kind of action proposed by the Amendment. All my advice is that if we were to write the Amendment into the Bill, we would be exceeding the rights which we enjoy under the Convention.
The Minister asserted that the legal status of resources of the shelf was different from that of petroleum before the passing of the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 in that during that period "who owned what rights was clearly established, the property was vested in somebody", whereas in the shelf resources: "There are no prior existing rights and it is only when the minerals themselves are severed from the Shelf that they become someone's property. The question of these Orders in Council has been reviewed, and upon legal advice it has been decided they should be allowed to stand, but if there were complaints that the existence of such Orders was not consistent with the Convention it would be necessary to consider their revocation or amendment.
None of the orders has been subsequently revoked or amended. the continental shelf is such a new concept that it is difficult to say that there is any international law upon it. It is for that very reason that this Convention is being entered into; therefore we are now engaged in the process of making by agreement new international law to cover a new concept.
Apart from its novelty in international law, the new concept was not easily adaptable into UK law for two major reasons. First, it is clear from the terms of the Convention in the light of the discussion in the International Law Commission and at the Geneva Conference that a coastal State does not enjoy sovereignty over the continental shelf; "sovereign rights" are not the same as sovereignty. This has the consequence that the shelf is not territory and cannot, consistently with the Convention, be statutorily incorporated within the United Kingdom or a dependent territory, or even be annexed to Her Majesty's dominions. The shelf is an extraterritorial area in which the coastal State may exercise only certain functions in respect of certain resources. Had the shelf been regarded as a subject of coastal State sovereignty, English-and Scottish-law would have a ready-made mechanism for translating sovereignty into territory and into Crown ownership. This mechanism is that of the royal prerogative, which contains a foreign affairs power under which sovereignty over new areas, both dry land and maritime, may be declared, as well as a power to acquire new territory, both dry land and maritime. These two heads of the prerogative operate consecutively: the foreign affairs prerogative, of which the ratification of a treaty is a manifestation, declares sovereignty (imperium) over a spatially defined area whereupon the acquisitive prerogative secures the area as territory which the Crown might then hold allodially as Crown land (dominium).™
The second difficulty in converting the treaty concept into UK law is that the terms of the Convention do not in themselves create proprietary rights, whether ownership or something less, in the natural resources of the shelf. They merely permit a coastal State, as against other State parties, to exercise a monopoly in exploration and exploitation. But whether, and if so how, that monopoly is to be exercised is not prescribed by the Convention, or by international law in general, but by the internal law of each coastal State. Under UK law, the Crown, if authorised by statute, may exercise a monopoly over the exploration and exploitation of natural resources in which the Crown might not possess ownership. This might have been the situation in respect of unworked petroleum and natural gas under the Petroleum (Production) Act 1918 up to the enactment of the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, which statutorily resolved the doubt over Crown ownership in these resources by vesting the property in them in the Crown. 130 But the 1918 Act, like the 1934 Act, was restricted to petroleum located "in Great Britain" and in practice there is likely to be less difficulty in enforcing monopoly powers over intra-territorial resources, even though unowned, than over resources which are both unowned and outside the United Kingdom.
It is not surprising to find, therefore, that instead of simply extending management powers to the natural resources of the shelf, it was sought to overcome the above difficulties by inserting into the legislation a "vesting" provision in the form of section 1(1). From the terms of his letters of 28 June and 16 September 1963 to the Ministry of Power's legal advisers, it appears that Rowe envisaged the vesting in the Crown of rights over all the shelf s natural resources, other than those in coal, and that he intended that the clause which became section 1(1) should effect this.
Whether section 1(1) achieves this intention, however, may be questioned. First, the expression "any rights exercisable by the United Kingdom" is intelligible only if it means those rights which are exercisable in international law by the United Kingdom in its capacity as a subject of international law. 131 Since the Crown may exercise international rights on behalf of the United Kingdom through its foreign affairs prerogative, the provision is therefore otiose as the Crown would hold such rights even without the existence of section 1(1). Quite apart from this point, however, as international law is not concerned with rights of ownership or property in spatially defined areas, leaving such matters to national laws, there are no rights of ownership or property flowing from the Convention for section 1(1) to vest in Her Majesty.
Turning to particular resources, section 1(3) of the 1964 Act applies certain sections of the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 to petroleum in the shelf "as they apply in relation to petroleum in Great Britain". The subsection, however, does not apply section 1(1) of the 1934 Act, which was the provision by virtue of which the ownership of petroleum in strata "in Great Britain", hitherto uncertain, was vested in the Crown. It is doubtful, therefore, whether section 1(3) has the effect of vesting ownership in shelf petroleum in the Crown. As for shelf coal, section 1(2) of the 1964 Act applied to shelf coal the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 "as it applies to coal in Great Britain". Before the 1946 Act the own- sidered that it was only the management regimes for coal and petroleum which had to be expressly extended in the new legislation. It is possible that this limitation to coal and petroleum occurred because the Law Officers had been referred to the legislation relating to these two minerals only, both minerals falling as they did within the responsibility of the Ministry of Power seeking the advice. It is clear from Rowe's letter to Johnstone of 28 June 1963 that he intended to draft a clause to vest in the Crown the ownership in other minerals which, in his opinion, would thus come under the Commissioners' powers in the 1961 Act. Clause 1(1) was the fruit of this intention and, indeed, it satisfied the Crown Estate Commissioners notwithstanding the fact that the minerals would not thereby be brought within the United Kingdom. But if section 1(1) was ineffective to vest ownership in the Crown, as is argued above, then both Rowe's intention and the Crown Estate Commissioners' satisfaction were unfulfilled. Furthermore, even if it is assumed that section 1(1) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 vested in the Crown rights of a type which could properly fall within the term "property, rights and interests" in section 1(1) of the Crown Estate Act 1961, it is still doubtful whether, in the absence of express amendment, the Commissioners' management powers under the latter Act were thereby expanded extraterritorially.
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So far, the basic concept of continental shelf rights in UK law has been judicially considered, obiter, in one case.
139 If other questions of concern to the executive have arisen in respect of the basic legal concept they are concealed in archives which are still closed. Although the continental shelf concept is no longer a novelty in international law, its domestic manifestation in section 1 of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 is not so unambiguous as to make the possibility of future disputes and litigation unrealistically remote. use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020589300058644
